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1. Introduction 
The importance of efficient water allocation is being increasingly realised all over the 
world. Increasing demand on water resources has been one of the main reasons why 
water shortage is becoming an important issue. For example, recently, The Economist 
drew attention towards the impending water crisis in China2. It is being increasingly 
argued that one of the main reasons behind the mismanagement of water resources is the 
non-existence of economic criteria in water allocation. Till now, water has been 
allocated by government agencies motivated mostly through non-economic criteria. 
Agencies such as the World Bank increasingly argue that efficient allocation of water is 
only possible through market based mechanisms and state examples of functioning 
water markets in several developing and developed nations. 
  The problem is difficult given that historically water has been treated as a 
"social" rather than an economic good. It is well accepted by policy makers that 
allocating water within the existing systems is inefficient. A need for a market based 
mechanism to allocate water efficiently is widely gaining acceptance. In its 1993 policy 
paper (Water Resources Management) the World Bank states that the deterioration and 
scarcity of fresh water in recent times is due to the "failure to properly consider the 
economic value of water. Given that water is given little or no economic value it is 
misallocated and misused." The argument behind this is simple, i.e. understanding the 
economic value of water leads to its efficient use. 
Water is a growing industry worldwide. Recent estimates put the world water 
market at $300 billion, with the United States accounting for more than half that 
amount. Two of the fastest growing markets are in water rights and municipal water 
supply systems. One should note that the development of water markets leads to a better 
definition of property rights. This by itself eliminates many of the problems related with 
inefficient allocation of water. The enforcement of property rights becomes difficult if 
incentives are not properly defined. 
Proper definition of property rights and the introduction of markets can alone not 
solve the problem. Another important issue is the overexploitation of groundwater. For 
example, it has been shown that competitive water withdrawal can lead to 
 
2 The crisis has been a result of water shortage combined with bad management, pollution and pricing of 
water below cost. 
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overexploitation (Moench, 1992). Over exploitation is a serious problem in the case of 
allowing open access to water. Penalties for over exploitation may be one answer. 
Another answer may be varying the price of water as aquifer levels reach critical levels. 
The price would then reflect the "real" value of water based on future scarcity3. Such 
real time pricing schemes are difficult to implement due to political reasons. 
Gordon (1954) showed that complete rent dissipation may occur from the 
exploitation of an open access resource. A single owner, internalizes exploitation 
externalities, and would be more efficient. The general result obtained in the literature is 
that there is an inverse relationship between the number of resource extractors and rent 
accrual. Mason and Philips (1997), for example, provide experimental evidence on the 
relationship between group size and the standing stock of a common resource. 
Experiments have been used by Walker et al. (1990), Walker and Gardner 
(1992), Gardner et al. (1997) to study common pool resource problems. Walker et al. 
(1990) and Walker and Gardner (1992) both use experiments to study non-cooperative 
game common pool resources. Walker et al. (1990) conclude that a high degree of rent 
dissipation occurred with access limited to eight users. In Walker and Gardner (1992) 
they show that the common pool resource is destroyed in all cases where no institutions 
exist to foster cooperative behaviour. Gardner et al. (1997) study strategic behaviour in 
groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources 
in West U.S. They experimentally study the performance of various groundwater 
property rights and the applicability of game theory in such systems. Limiting entry en 
such environments improves efficiency. 
In a recent study, Murphy et al. (2000) use laboratory experiments to design 
"smart" computer assisted markets for water. The ‘smart’ computer assisted market 
institution was developed by McCabe et al. (1989, 1991). A ‘smart’ market allows 
decentralized agents to submit messages to a computer dispatch centre. The centre then 
computes prices and allocations by applying an optimization algorithm that maximizes 
the possible gains from exchange. Using California as a case study, Murphy et. al. 
(2000) test alternative institutional arrangements for a computer assisted spot market. In 
a thin market characterized by a limited set of trading opportunities, they show that the 
 
3 Such a policy would imply that the price of water goes up in times of water scarcity. 
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`smart' uniform price double auction yield highly efficient outcomes. Co-tenancy 
seemed to improve efficiency over a monopoly in transportation. 
  The studies mentioned above clearly show that experiments can be a useful test 
bed to study alternative property right mechanisms (Walker et al., 1990; Walker and 
Gardner, 1992), or undertake a direct test of an existing market mechanism (Murphy et 
al., 2000). Experiments can replicate important characteristics of existing markets and 
test them in a laboratory setting at a minimal cost to the regulator.  
There is another aspect to water markets that has been given little attention. This 
has to do with the quality of water that each consumer, farm and household, receives. 
The quality of water for household use is regulated by quality standards. Quality 
standards for farm use are much weaker. Any firm supplying water to two different 
users that differ in their minimum acceptable qualities has an additional dimension to 
deal with. That is, what is the optimal mix of qualities that the firm should supply to its 
users?. 
  In this paper we define a water market that includes standard features such as 
common pool resource management, depuration costs and water quality. In our 
experimental market the firm has to also decide the quality that it should supply to 
households and to farmers. The quality of household water cannot be below a certain 
minimum standard while the quality of farm water has no such restriction. Our results 
indicate that a social monopolist offers the highest quality to price ratio and exploits the 
resource at a faster rate than a private monopoly or duopoly. The most stable stocks 
correspond to a private monopoly and duopoly. Though, their stock levels are 
inefficiently high. The average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopolist is 
the highest. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the model. In Section 
3 we discuss our experimental design. Section 4 discusses the experimental results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 There are two renewable stocks SH (high quality) and SL (low quality) from which 
water may be extracted. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the recharge to the 
respective basin is deterministic and constant. The inflow to the respective basins is 
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assumed to cease when the storage capacity of the aquifer is reached. That is, once the 
maximum storable stock is reached, extra water inflow is lost. The return flow of 
consumed water is assumed to be negligible. Thus, changes in the stocks are exclusively 
due to extraction and recharge. Extraction costs are supposed to be twice differentiable 
functions of quantity and stock size. First derivatives are assumed to be, respectively, 
positive and negative, whereas second derivatives are positive. 
We allow for the possibility that the water resources differ in qualities. Quality 
of water in an aquifer may be lower due to marine intrusion, or due to infiltration of 
fertilizer from agriculture. Let the qualities be denoted respectively by QH and QL, 
where QH > QL >0. The qualities are assumed to be constant over time. However, any 
intermediate quality may be supplied to the consumers as a result of mixing water from 
the two sources. Mixing quantities KH and KL of the two qualities results in water whose 
quality is given by the weighted average: 
LH
LLHH
LHLHM KK
QKQKQQKKQ +
+=),,,(    (1) 
Quality of potable water should weakly exceed the constant minimum quality 
standard Qmin, where QH >Qmin >QL. Mixed water of quality QM may, or may not, satisfy 
the minimum quality standard. This depends on the quantities and the qualities which 
are mixed. Quality may be improved at a cost. This cost is an increasing function of the 
difference between the quality before and after purification. Moreover, a given 
improvement ΔQ of a lower quality is less costly than the same improvement performed 
on a higher quality. Let the initial quality subject to purification be Q0. The purification 
cost, denoted by CΔQ(K, ΔQ, Q0), for a certain water quality Q0 and quantity K=KH+KL 
requiring a quality improvement ΔQ, is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:  
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Resource flow between the sources and the consumers is coordinated by a 
centralized knot, which centralizes the decisions about quantity and quality supplied to 
the consumers. Figure 1 shows the distribution scheme described above. 
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Figure 1. The hydrological network 
 
 
Suppose that the behaviour of the consumers can be aggregated under one of two 
types: i) households (h) and ii) farmers (F). Consumers differ in their respective 
preferences regarding the quality of water. Both types prefer a higher quality of the 
water to a lower one. Farmers prefer more quantity of each product to less. Households 
consume water whose quality weakly exceeds a minimum standard. If mixed quality 
does not satisfy this condition, it will be subject to purification. The purification 
procedure is assumed to be costly enough such that it is not profitable to improve 
quality above the minimum standard. Hence, the quality consumed by households is the 
maximum between the minimum, and the mixed, quality. Thus, Q0 = QM and 
ΔQ Q Q if Q Qif Q Q
M M
M
= − >≤
⎧⎨⎩
min min
min
,
,0  
Let the households take the purification cost into account in their utility function. 
Further, assume utility functions for the respective consumer-types, Uh=Uh(Kh,QMh) and 
UF=UF(KF,QMF) (where Kh=KHh+KLh, and KF=KHF+KLF), to be twice differentiable 
with respect to the quantity and the mixed quality. A farmers’ utility is increasing in 
both arguments. While depending on the purification cost function, the utility function 
of households might be increasing in the quantity of low quality only up to a certain 
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limit4. From twice differentiability of the utility functions it follows that the sum of the 
functions is twice differentiable, too. The indirect social welfare function V(KH,KL), 
which maximizes consumer surplus for a given quantity of water, can be obtained as a 
solution to the following problem: 
LFHF
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(3) 
As a benchmark for our experimental results, we are interested in the socially 
optimal solution of water supply. Given the assumptions above, we formulate the 
program that maximizes social welfare.5 Without loss of generality, suppose that 
initially the resource stocks are in the natural hydrological equilibrium, i.e. at the upper 
bound of the storage capacity. Let ( ) denote recharges of the two water qualities 
of water, and t0 the starting time of extraction. Assume that the social rate of discount is 
δ=1. Thus, the intertemporal objective function is formulated as follows: 
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4 In fact, it will be increasing if mixed quality weakly exceeds the minimum quality standard. 
5 This problem is solvable by means of optimal control theory, where the stocks are the states and the 
quantities the control variables. 
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By means of the resulting current value Hamiltonian and Pontryagin’s maximum 
principle (assuming an interior solution) the two following conditions have to be 
satisfied in the hydro-economic equilibrium: 
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The conditions in (5) simultaneously determine the steady-state standing-stocks 
of SH and SL. They basically state that, in the long-run, the marginal social utility, which 
embod
3. Experimental design
Our experimental design focuses on studying how different market structures affect 
water resource management. Upstream firms do not extract from a common resource8. 
We instead focus on situations where property rights to a given groundwater source are 
exclusively granted to a single decision making unit. 
el. Our model also highlights the vertical 
nature of these markets. In these markets coordination is required between water 
d supply9. 
urchase up to a certain amount of 
                                                
ies the respective resource price in the economy, should equal the social costs of 
extraction represented on the right hand side.6
 
7
Two water sources supply water of two different qualities. The demand side is 
represented by two different types of consumers: households and farmers. Water 
supplied to them may be the result of purification, since households will only consume 
water whose quality exceeds a minimum lev
extraction, purification an
Our assumptions concerning consumer utility are qualitatively similar to those in 
Williams et al. (1986) on multiple commodities which are interdependent in 
consumption. Two features, which are rather specific to the dynamics of water, are 
added to the structure: first, buyers are restricted to p
 
6 In each condition, the first two terms (both positive) represent the marginal cost which results from 
imental design is based on a previous paper by Georgantzís et al. (2004). 
ical integration. 
extracting a quantity KH (KL) from the water stock SH (SL). The third term reflects the shadow price of the 
resource.  
7 Our exper
8 Competitive extraction is not studied in this paper. 
9 We do not specifically address issues related to vert
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each ty
eriods. A seller can sell water of high and low 
quality
se the model described above with the following values for the parameters: 
opt the discrete 
version
at (SH, (5, ieved when exactly the 3-unit inflow of each 
water q y  that this is so, then, 
maxim h) = (2.55, 0) and (KHF, KLF) = (0.45, 3), 
are auto iculture 
(F) consumption. To avoid subjects making uncontrolled guesses concerning the end of 
pe of water10. Second, a constant inflow (recharge) in each period maintains the 
stock of water in the basins of each producer. In fact, following a standard formulation 
of similar groundwater extraction problems, a lower stock implies a higher extraction 
cost. Thus, each period’s marginal cost and past levels of extraction are positively 
correlated. 
All experiments ran for 50 p
. Sellers simultaneously post bids for a maximum of 5 units of each water 
quality. Demand is simulated in all treatments and buyers reveal perfectly. A utility 
maximizing consumer represents a population of farmers and households with different 
preferences for the quantity and quality of water. Different qualities are obtained from 
mixing the two qualities of water sold in the market. If quality falls below a certain 
"potable" threshold, an extra cost is borne by the consumer (reducing consumer surplus) 
in order for the water to be depurated up to the threshold level. Unit extraction costs 
increase in "steps" as the level of stock of each water quality decreases.  
We u
(i) Recharge: (aH, aL)=(3, 3) 
(ii) Initial and maximum stock sizes (SH, SL)=(20, 20)  
(iii) Water qualities: (QH, QL)=(5, 1)  
(iv) Minimum quality standard demanded by the household: Qmin = 3 
The specific utility and cost functions used are provided in appendix C. 
Applying the above equations, in the steady state of the social optimum a stock size of 
(SH, SL)=(4.84, 5.01) is obtained associated with the prices (pH, pL)=(102, 86). However, 
in order to simplify subjects’ perceived feedback conditional on their strategies, our 
design allows only for discrete quantities and prices. Thus, if subjects ad
 of this steady-state equilibrium stock policy, they must aim at stabilizing stocks 
SL)= 5). Obviously, this is ach
ualit equals the quantity sold in each period. Assuming
izing total surplus the quantities, (KHh, KL
matically assigned by the server, respectively, for household (h) and agr
                                                 
10 Given that their purchases in each period are used to serve their current needs. 
 
 
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the ses
tudy resource management 
and wa
sion, a deterministic end game horizon was used (a total of 50 periods), of which 
subjects were informed at the beginning of the experiment.11
Subjects knew the type of water they were managing. That is, they were 
conscious about a generic preference by consumers for one good (high quality) over the 
other. Moreover, they knew that their products were demand substitutes (though not 
perfectly) and that their extraction cost structures were identical. Subjects received a 
table with their unit costs depending on the stock size (see the instructions in the 
appendix). A simulator (made available to them) informs them on the hypothetical costs 
and gains they would make if they sold all the units of each product for which they are 
currently submitting post bids. They know that the actual number of units they sell will 
be known only after they have posted their period bids and that the (automated) 
demand’s reaction to these bids is returned to them on the feedback screen. 
Three different market structures are compared. We s
ter allocation under a private monopoly, a competing duopoly and the social 
planner. Three simplest markets are chosen given that we do not have a benchmark to 
start from. As we mention, the existing experimental literature has looked at problems 
motivated by specific problems.12 We instead choose an experimental design that 
studies the effect of market structure upon resource management and water allocation. 
We do not focus on competitive resource extraction at this stage as several water 
allocation agencies are the sole suppliers of water to their respective areas. We study the 
following treatments: 
T1 - Private Monopoly: The monopolist has joint ownership of both sources. 
Consumer behaviour is simulated. They reveal perfectly and accept trades at zero 
surplus. The monopolist posts price-bids for both water qualities. Given these offers, the 
maximal consumer rent is determined in the simulated centralized downstream market: 
V(KH,KL)-w´ k, where w denotes the vector of sealed offers and k denotes the vector of 
quantities. Thus, the bundle of high quality and low quality water which produces the 
highest consumer rent is allocated in the economy.  
T2 – Private Duopoly: The market is supplied by a non-cooperative duopoly. 
Each firm offers one type of water and independently decides on price-bids. There is 
                                                 
11 Given the complex nature of the experiments a sufficiently long time horizon was chosen. 
12 For example, Murphy et al. motivate their research based on water allocation in California. 
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 not permitted. Duopolies are formed randomly at the beginning 
of the 
optimal simulated coordination in the downstream part of the market. Communication 
between competitors is
session and then matching remains fixed over the 50 periods of the session 
(“partners” protocol)13. 
T3 - Public Monopoly: The public monopoly decides on both water qualities. 
Note, however, that the public monopoly only decides on the price and quality offered, 
and not the quantity. It is required to meet demand at all stages. Like in all treatments 
reported here, there is optimal simulated coordination in the downstream part of the 
market. Subjects act as public monopolists, maximizing total social welfare rather than 
private
th, the maximum quantity each one of them could trade). In the 
case of
atically calculating the optimal consumption of each water quality 
and the
                                                
 profits.    
A history window displays all past outcomes regarding own decisions, i.e. 
quantities, payoffs and market prices. In duopoly markets, each subject also receives the 
clearing price at which the “other” water quality was sold. In each period, subjects are 
asked to submit their respective reservation prices (offer bids) for each unit of product 
(from the 1st unit to the 5
 the duopoly, rivals had to post, simultaneously, five sealed offers of each quality 
water which should equal the minimum price at which they were willing to sell the 
respective unit.14 Subjects were told that offer bids had to exceed weakly the cost of the 
corresponding unit, and offers of subsequent units would have to be non-decreasing. 
Once offer bids are submitted, behaviour on the demand side is simulated by a 
programme autom
ir distribution by consumer type for which total consumer surplus is maximized. 
After bids were announced, all units of the same product in a period were sold at the 
same market price (see instructions). This price was the maximum offer bid lying below 
the lowest willingness to pay on a demand function-like ranking from high to low. All 
subjects were informed about how the market price is determined. 
 
13 Two possible extensions can be run in this experimental design, the “strangers” protocol and a “co-
ordinated” duopoly. “Strangers” protocol, forming a different subject-pair (duopoly) in each period, 
would be an interesting extension, the resulting noisy feedback would require allowing for longer 
experimental sessions. Pilot sessions not reported here indicate the sessions lasting longer than 70 periods 
are required. In the case of a coordinated duopoly each resource is managed by a different subject, but the 
interface used is that of the private monopoly with two subjects sitting in front of each one of the PC’s. 
Communication and agreement on the timing of decision submission and the possibility of iterated 
inspection of the “competitor’s” strategy before jointly pressing the “OK” button render this setup highly 
collusive. However, individual incentives remained uncoordinated and no side payments were feasible. 
14 Producers in treatments 1 and 3 had to post five sealed offers for each one of the two water qualities.   
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ual subject rewards, 
inducin
finding in the literature. 
he descriptive statistics (last 15 periods) in table 1 give us a good idea on how 
rces were managed under each market structure. The first result that one sees 
Experimental sessions were run at the Laboratori d’Economia Experimental 
(LEE) of the Universitat Jaume I of Castellón, Spain. Three 20-subject sessions were 
run for treatments 1 and 3, and five 20-subject (10 duopolies) sessions were run for 
treatment 2. A number of pilot rounds (not presented here) were run at the beginning of 
each session. Sessions from different treatments were run in a random order in order for 
“social learning” to be avoided. Sessions lasted an average of 80 minutes each. In all 
treatments, the subjects’ monetary rewards were proportional to accumulated profits 
(‘social benefits’ in T3) along 15 (randomly chosen) over the 50 periods. Average per 
subject earnings were slightly below 25€, approximately. Duopoly sessions were 
systematically more expensive, as a higher exchange rate was used (see instructions in 
appendix B) in order to avoid significant differences in individ
g the feeling of “unfair” variations of per capita earnings across treatments (apart 
from the horizontal externality due to competition, each duopolist manages only a part 
of the market). 
 
4. Results 
The steady state equilibrium stock level for our discrete strategy space version of the 
model implemented here is 5 for both water qualities. Once this level is reached, the 
optimal extraction rate is dictated by the rate of the inflow. That is, in each period a firm 
should aim at selling 3 units of each water type (equal to the amount entering into the 
tank due to the natural rate of inflow). An efficient management is one in which these 
predictions are fulfilled over the maximum number of periods possible. Given the 
specificity of our design and focus, we report data on price levels for each water quality 
and price-weighted average quality sold to the consumers, which cannot be contrasted 
to any previous 
T
water resou
is that the average stock of water under a private monopoly (T1) and duopoly (T2) is 
higher than under a social planner (T3). The average stock of the social planner is 
around 25% lower than under any other market structure. This is true for both high, and 
low, quality water. A welfare maximizing social planner, not operating under market 
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n be followed by a brief 
discussion on the co-ordinated duopoly experiments. 
 
4.1. Sto anage
 m e  e
o
management is one of the problems faced by many countries across the world. Given 
, we compare how a public monopoly manages its water resources relative to a 
i e) y n a uo ly F re
anagement across the three market structures for the low and high quality stock. All 
treatme
opoly treatment, which is the only 
one presenting a sustained decreasing tendency. Note, however, that the steady state 
 reached by the public monopolist at the end of the experiment. 
High Quality 
Price 
Average 
Quality/Price 
Low Quality 
Quantity 
High Quality 
Quantity 
incentives, tends to over extract the (non-competing) resource. Interestingly the average 
quality to price ratio is the same for a monopoly and duopoly. 
 
Table 1 
Low Quality 
Stock 
High Quality 
Stock 
Low Quality Price
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
Avg. 11.4 12.4 9.5 12.7 11.1 9.3 101.9 69.8 51.1 108.8 75.7 67.1 0.04 0.04 0.11 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.1
S.D 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.9 11.9 5.2 9.1 12.0 8.1 12.3 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
A
(20-
v. 
50) 
10.9 11.7 8.7 12.2 10.5 8.3 108.4 72.2 52.0 113.6 80 69.8 0.03 0.04 0.10 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.0
S.
(20-
 
We will now individually analyze stock management, quantity sold and the 
average quality to price ratio in each treatment. This will the
D. 
50) 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 6.5 3.6 8.7 9.5 5.3 12.7 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
ck M ment 
In any countries (Spain being one xample) wat r management is in the hand public 
monopolies. Studies by the W rld Bank indicate that inefficient water resources 
this
(pr vat  monopol  a d  d po . igu s 2 and 3 compare water resource 
m
nts produce average stocks which lie significantly above the steady state socially 
optimum level (5 units). Comparing across treatments, one sees that the average stock 
of both water qualities is the lowest in the public mon
socially optimum level is
Interestingly, in period 50 both the (private) monopoly and duopoly are substantially 
above this (around 10) steady state optimum. Figure 2 indicates that the duopoly 
maintains higher stock levels than the private monopoly for the low quality stock. The 
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contrary is true for the high quality stock. A Wilcoxon test on the data indicates that the 
stocks maintained by the three market structures are statistically different (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
Low Quality Stock High Quality Stock 
 Z p>|z| Z p>|z| 
T1 = T2 -6.393 0.00 6.384 0.00 
T1 = T3 6.342 0.00 6.359 0.00 
T3=T2 
 
-6.384 0.00 -6.307 0.00 
 
It is clearly seen that the private monopoly maintains a higher stock than the 
duopoly for the high quality water and the opposite is true for low quality water. Stocks 
maintained by the private monopoly and duopoly are higher than the stocks maintained 
by the public monop
<Figure 2 here (s ow quality)> 
<Figure 3 here (stock: high quality)> 
 
4.2. Quantity s
Observing figures 4 and 5, we see that there is significant variation in the quantity 
rovided across the three market structures. 
n the high and low quantities sold indicates that the quantity 
sold by the private mon ly different for the low 
quality water (see table private monopoly sells 
n average) greater quantity than the duopoly for the low quality, the converse if true 
. For all the other pairings, the differences are statistically significant 
 
private monopolist is h quality water. This 
result is consistent wit
oly. 
tock: l
old 
p
<Figure 4 here (quantity: low quality)> 
<Figure 5 here (quantity: high quality)> 
 
A Wilcoxon test o
opoly and the duopoly is not statistical
3 below). Note, however, that while the 
(o
for the high quality
across all treatments. One also sees that the public monopoly sells a higher quantity 
compared to both the private monopoly and the duopoly. The quantity sold by the
higher for the low, and lower for the hig
h the stock management results seen earlier. 
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Table 3 
Quantity - Low Q  Quantity - High Q 
 z p>|z| z p>|z| 
T1 = T2 1.606 0.1083 -3.276 0.001 
T1 = T3 -3.798 0.000 -5.64 0.000 
T3 = T2 
 
3.720 0.000 4.619 0.000 
 
 
4.3. Average quality to price ratio 
PQ / , where: Figure 6 presents the average quality/price ratio as  
 
LH
LLHH
KK
QKQ ⋅+KQ +
⋅= nd  a  
LH
HH
K
PKP +
LL PK
K
⋅+⋅= . It can be easily seen that the 
public mon ovides igh ity e ra tive to all other 
treatments. The ratio provided by the duopoly is slightly above the private monopoly. 
Another st ture is olat ern  ratio ed in the public 
monopoly treatment. This is in sharp contrast with the smooth patterns of the other two 
market structures. This difference can be understood knowing that the public 
monopolist receives feedback which partly, but directly, depends on the consumer’s 
sumer’s loss associated with the cost of depuration, 
 affects the feedback 
received by subjects on the suc  their strategies. Volatility
continuous effort of subjects (representing the social planner) to cope with the 
opoly pr  the h est qual to pric tio rela
riking fea  the v ile patt of the  obtain
social welfare. Specifically, the con
in case the quality falls below the “potable” threshold, negatively
cess of  arises due to the 
additional objective of maintaining quality above a certain level (in order not to trigger 
the costly (inefficient) depuration procedure). 
<Figure 6 here> 
Table 4 below presents the Wilcoxon t-test comparing average quality levels 
across the three market structures. Average quality across all three market treatments is 
statistically different across all three treatments. Note, however, that the average quality 
supplied by the duopoly is greater than supplied by the private monopolist. The public 
monopoly meanwhile supplies higher quality compared to both the private monopoly 
and duopoly. 
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                                                      Table 4 
Average Quality/price 
 z p>|z| 
T1 = T 0.00 2 -6.393 
T1 = T3 -6.393 0.00 
T3 = T2 
 
6.393 0.00 
 
 
4.4. Coordinated duopoly 
We on tests for the coordinated duopoly and 
private monopoly. Interestingly  quality stocks maintained by 
the two are statistically different, the quantit  offere sale by the coordinated 
duopoly and private monopo  statist ffere
Tab
 e mo y vs. 
Coordinated Duopoly 
ly present the results for the Wilcoxon t-
, while the low and high
ies d for 
ly are not ically di nt. 
le 5 
Privat nopol
 z p>|z| 
Low Quality Stock 2.639 0.008 
High Quality Stock 4.994 0.00 
Average Quality -3.733 0.000 
Low Quality Quantity 0.103 0.918 
High Quality Quantity -0.327 0.7435 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our setup assumes extraction from separate  in the distribution 
stage. This structure is inspired by the problem, of growing importance in many 
countries, conce ggrega  disaggreg of decision making 
and managemen . For e, recently the decision of the central 
Spanish governm he deci anagement of the 
river Ebro’s resources found strong opposition by local governments fearing a loss of 
 pools and competition
rning the level of a tion (or ation) 
t of national aquifers exampl
ent to centralize t sion making process and m
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control over the part they were previous opolizing. xperimental results 
suggest that, m ecisio g,15 what  are the incentives. 
Prices are useful in allocating water resources even in the case of the public monopoly 
 our experiments. Compared to a public monopoly, a market based mechanism 
, though inefficient, stock levels. Further note that output supplied by 
ons, they have to 
regulat
onger 
session
                                                
ly mon Our e
ore than centralizing d n makin  matters
in
maintains higher
the private monopoly and duopoly is not significantly different in our experiments. 
Otherwise, all outputs across all treatments are statistically different. 
One sees that the private monopoly and duopoly maintain inefficiently higher 
water stocks (low and high quality) than the public monopoly. The stocks maintained by 
the public monopoly are at the optimal level at the end of the sessions. Given that stocks 
are declining, it is not clear if the public monopoly would have been able to maintain 
stocks at the optimal level for longer experimental sessions. The average quality to price 
ratio is highest for the public monopoly and the difference across all treatments is 
statistically significant. Further experiments need to be run to see how increasing the 
number of firms, and/or increasing the number of periods, affects stock depletion. 
One also needs to understand some fundamental differences under which a 
public monopoly operates in our experiments. In our setup the social planner is not 
allowed to set quantities. Instead, as occurs in real world situati
e consumption by posting the right price at which an each extra unit should be 
sold. Incentives for the public monopoly are such that subjects post their bids aiming at 
simultaneously satisfying the condition for the hydrological equilibrium of the system 
(“stock recharge equals consumption”) and, at the same time, keeping stocks at the 
desired “not too low” levels. This is done without letting average quality fall below the 
“potable” standard in order not to trigger depuration. Whether this induces a persistent 
learning shortcoming or not is not answered by our results so far. Therefore, an 
interesting extension of the experiments presented here would be to allow for l
s, or calling experienced subjects back to take part in another experiment. 
 
 
 
 
15 Both the public and private monopoly are equally centralized in our experiments. What differentiates 
them are the incentives under which they operate. 
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6. Appendix A: Figures 
Figure-3
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Figure-2
Low quality stock
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Figure-4
Quantity of low quality water
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Figure-5
Quantity of high quality water
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Figure-6
Average quality/price ratio
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6. Appendix B: Instructions (translated from Spanish) 
Treatment 1 
The aim of this experiment is to study how people make their decisions in certain contexts. 
Your decisions in the scenario explained below in detail, will be directly related to a monetary 
reward you will receive in cash at the end of the experiment. Any doubt you may have will be 
clarified personally to you by one of the organizers after you raise your hand. Beyond these 
questions, any other communication is strictly forbidden and is subject to immediate exclusion 
from the experiment.  
You participate in a market which is characterized by the following features: 
• You are the only producer of two commodities: product H and product L. Specifically, 
product H is water of High quality, while product L is water of Low quality. Products H 
and L are substitutes, namely, consumers may, to a certain extent, substitute one type of 
water with the other. 
• There are two types of consumers: households and farmers. Although they have different 
preferences with respect to the two types of water, they all prefer water of high quality 
(product H) to water of low quality (product L). That is, they are willing to pay more for H 
than for L. 
• The market lasts for 50 rounds. 
Decision Making 
Your only decision as a producer is announcing the minimum price at which you are willing to 
sell each one of the first five units of each product. Such announcements of minimum prices are 
called price bids. In order to make your biding decisions, you have to take into account that: 
1.  The extraction cost per additional unit extracted and by product is included in the “table of 
costs” bellow. These costs are the same for the two products, and they are expressed in 
ExCUs, a fictitious Experimental Currency Unit. 
2. Taking into account the costs of the table, you have to announce five minimum prices at 
which you are willing to sell each unit of the first five units of each product. Therefore, 
your decision making consists of fixing 5 price bids for each product. 
3. You should have in mind that, in order not to make any losses, price bids cannot be lower 
than the corresponding unit costs included in the table of costs. 
4. Price bids cannot be decreasing. That is, your bid for the 1st unit cannot be higher than your 
bid for the 2nd unit; the bid for the 2nd cannot be higher than the bid for the 3rd unit, and so 
on and so forth. 
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ck size. At the beginning of the 
u have an initial stock size of 20 units for each product. At the beginning of each 
5. Observe in the table that the unit costs decrease with the sto
session, yo
round, you get three more units for each type of water.  
6. Your stock size, for both types of water, can never exceed 20 units and, therefore, any 
additional (over 20) units you may receive are immediately lost.  
    Table of costs (expressed in ExCUs) 
Stock size 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 
Unit cost 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 4 
           
Stock size 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Unit cost 7 11 18 30 50 82 135 223 368 607
 
Sup
of th
in th  for a stock size of 12 units, the unit cost for the first five units extracted is the 
st unit: 2 ExCUs    
 
your bids should not be lower than the 
than
ExC rd unit should not be 
inning of next round would 
your
begi d). 
Example  
pose that at the end of a round your stock size of, say product H, is 9 units. At the beginning 
e new round, you get your additional 3 units (so that your stock now is 12 units). Observe 
e table that,
following: 
• the cost of the 1
• the cost of the 2nd unit: 4 ExCUs 
• the cost of the 3rd unit: 7 ExCUs 
• the cost of the 4th unit: 11 ExCUs 
• the cost of the 5th unit: 18 ExCUs 
In order not to make any losses, each one of 
corresponding unit cost. Therefore, in this example, your bid for the 1st unit should not be lower 
 2 ExCUs (cost of the 1st unit); your bid for the 2nd unit should not be lower than neither 4 
Us (cost of this unit) nor your bid for the 1st unit; your bid for the 3
lower than neither 7 ExCUs nor your bid for the 2nd unit, and so on for the rest of the units. 
In case you sell 5 units of this product, the stock size at the beg
be 10 units (7 you kept plus 3 you get in the new round). If, given your bids for the five units, 
 sales are zero, your stock would be 15 units (12 you already had plus 3 you get at the 
nning of the roun
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• 
oxes that appear at your computer 
The bids you submit have 
to be integer numb
•  you may pro  fiv ffer pric s, n f the same product will be 
consumers at a gle price. This price will b our bid fo he st” 
each product. The num er of its so  each  which 
optimal behaviour  
 
E
 the example above, assume that your bids for one of the products are: 10 (for the 1st unit), 12 
nd), 14 (for the 3rd), 16 (for the 4th) and 20 (for the 5th). Given your bids, the program 
of a product will be the difference between the market 
ts of that specific product (your unit income) and the 
otal profits will be the sum of the unit profits for all 
 
Taking again the previous exam
t 
Decisions  
You take decisions on the minimum price at which you are willing to sell each unit of each 
one of the the two products. You will fill in all the b
screen with your price bids (5 bids for product H and 5 for product L). In each box, you 
will also get information related to the corresponding unit cost. 
ers between zero and 2000.  
 Although pose e di ent e bid all u its o
sold to sin e y r t “la unit sold of 
b un ld  period is calculated by a program
simulates the of consumers.
xample 
In
(for the 2
which simulates the optimal behaviour of consumers determines that 3 units of this product will 
be sold. The price at which you will sell the three units will be your bid for the 3rd unit, that is, 
14 ExCUs.  
 
The profits 
• Your net profit of selling each unit 
price at which you sold all uni
corresponding unit extraction cost. T
periods. 
Example 
ple, if, at the beginning of a round, your stock size is 12 units, 
your total profits in that round will be 29 ExCUs, which are decomposed as follows: 
i)  12 ExCUs for the 1st unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 2 ExCUs it 
costs you extracting it). 
ii) 10 ExCUs for the 2nd unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 4 ExCUs i
costs you extracting it). 
iii) 7 ExCUs for the 3rd unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 7 ExCUs it 
costs you extracting it).  
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ward at the end of the session will be the sum of your profits 
 
The 
 case you sell 5 units. 
At the end of each round, the computer screen will show you the total profits obtained in 
und, including information about unit cost, market price and number of units sold of 
 order to make sure you understood correctly the market described, we will proceed next to 
ssion of 5 rounds. Please, feel free to make any questions you may have during this 
 
Tha
 
• Your monetary re
accumulated in 15 rounds (randomly selected by the computer) of the total of 50 rounds, at 
an equivalence rate of 800 ExCUs=1 Euro. You will be paid in cash at the end of the 
session. 
information 
• During decision making, the computer will provide you with a table (for each product) on 
which, conditional to your bid and cost for the corresponding unit, the revenue as the net 
profit are calculated in each of the five possible scenarios: a) In case you only sell the 1st 
unit; b) If you just sell the first two units; …e) In
• 
that ro
each product. 
• During the experiment, you will have at your computer screen a history of past rounds 
(market price for each product, number of units sold of each product, total revenue and total 
profits per product). 
 
In
run a pilot se
pilot session. The aim is that you should take control of your own decision making. 
nk you very much for your collaboration. Good luck!  
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The 
You
rewa ll receive in cash at the end of the experiment. Any doubt you may have will be 
larified personally to you by one of the organizers after you raise your hand. Beyond these 
r communication is strictly forbidden and is subject to immediate exclusion 
 
• H and product L). 
ith the other. 
 in this room, randomly selected by the computer when the session 
starts. 
 more for H 
than for L. 
ecision Making 
our only decision as a producer is announcing the minimum price at which you are willing to 
sell each one of the first five units of your product. Such announcements of minimum prices are 
called price bids. In order to make your biding decisions, you have to take into account that: 
1.  The extraction cost per additional unit extracted and by product is included in the “table of 
costs” bellow. These costs are the same for the two products (therefore, costs conditions for 
you and your competitor are identical), and they are expressed in ExCUs, a fictitious 
Experimental Currency Unit. 
2. Taking into account the costs of the table, you have to announce five minimum prices at 
which you are willing to sell each unit of the first five units of your product. Therefore, 
your decision making consists of fixing 5 price bids. 
Treatment 2 
aim of this experiment is to study how people make their decisions in certain contexts. 
r decisions in the scenario explained below in detail, will be directly related to a monetary 
rd you wi
c
questions, any othe
from the experiment.  
You are part of a market which is ruled out by the following characteristics: 
There are two producers (1 and 2) and two commodities (product 
Specifically, product H is water of High quality, while product L is water of Low quality. 
Products H and L are substitutes, namely, consumers may, to a certain extent, substitute one 
type of water w
• You are one of the two producers in this market. At the beginning of the session, the 
computer will indicate if you are producer 1 or 2. Your competitor will be one (always the 
same) of the subjects
• There are two types of consumers: households and farmers. Although they have different 
preferences with respect to the two types of water, they all prefer water of high quality 
(product H) to water of low quality (product L). That is, they are willing to pay
• The market will last for 50 rounds. 
 
D
Y
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 have in mind that, in order not to make any losses, price bids cannot be lower 
an initial stock size of 20 units for each product. At the beginning of each 
round, you get three more units for each type of water.  
6. therefore, any 
 
S 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 
3. You should
than the corresponding unit costs included in the table of costs. 
4. Price bids cannot be decreasing. That is, your bid for the 1st unit cannot be higher than your 
bid for the 2nd unit; the bid for the 2nd cannot be higher than the bid for the 3rd unit, and so 
on and so forth. 
5. Observe in the table that the unit costs decrease with the stock size. At the beginning of the 
session, you have 
Your stock size, for both types of water, can never exceed 20 units and, 
additional (over 20) units you may receive are immediately lost.  
    Table of costs (expressed in ExCUs) 
tock size 20 
Unit cost 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 4 
           
Stock size 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Unit cost 7 11 18 30 50 82 135 223 368 607
 
Exa
Suppose that at the end of a round your stock size is 9 units. At the beginning of the new round, 
our stock now is 12 units). Observe in the table that, for 
 stock size of 12 units, the unit cost for the first five units extracted is the following: 
st unit: 2 ExCUs    
 
corr , in this example, your bid for the 1st unit should not be lower 
ExCUs (cost 
not be lower t o on for the rest of the units. 
mple  
you get your additional 3 units (so that y
a
• the cost of the 1
• the cost of the 2nd unit: 4 ExCUs 
• the cost of the 3rd unit: 7 ExCUs 
• the cost of the 4th unit: 11 ExCUs 
• the cost of the 5th unit: 18 ExCUs 
In order not to make any losses, each one of your bids should not be lower than the 
esponding unit cost. Therefore
than 2 ExCUs (cost of the 1st unit); your bid for the 2nd unit should not be lower than neither 4 
of this unit) nor the bid you fixed for the 1st unit; your bid for the 3rd unit should 
han neither 7 ExCUs or your bid for the 2nd unit, and s
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you he five units, your sales are 
roun
 
• 
h your price bids. In each box, you 
 Although you may propose five different price bids, all units of the same product will be 
sold to consumers r bid for the “last” unit sold of 
duct. The num  of s so  ea eri s ula by ro  which 
optimal behaviour  
 
Example 
In the example above, assume that your bids for one of the products are: 10 (for the 1  unit), 12 
(f  14 (for the 3rd) 6 (fo e 4th d 2 th) ve u , m 
hich simulates the optimal behaviour of consumers determines that 3 units of this product will 
e price at which you will sell the three units will be your bid for the 3rd unit, that is, 
h nit wi rence between the market price at 
your unit income) and the corresponding 
e sum of the unit profits for all periods. 
Example 
Taking again the previous exam at the beginning of a round, your stock size is 12 units, 
otal profits for that round will be 29 ExCUs, which are decomposed as follows: 
u receive for that unit m
In case you sell 5 units, the stock size at the beginning of next round would be 10 units (7 
kept plus 3 you get in the new round). If, given your bids for t
zero, your stock would be 15 units (12 you already had plus 3 you get at the beginning of the 
d). 
Decisions  
You take decisions about price bids at which you are willing to sell your product. You will 
fill in the boxes that appear at your computer screen wit
will also get information related to the corresponding unit cost. The bids you submit have 
to be integer numbers between zero and 2000. 
•
at a single price. This price will be you
your pro ber unit ld in ch p od i calc ted  a p gram
simulates the of consumers.
st
or the 2nd), , 1 r th ) an 0 (for the 5 . Gi n yo r bids  the progra
w
be sold. Th
14 ExCUs.  
 
The profits 
• Your net profit of selling eac  u ll be the diffe
which you sold all units of that specific product (
unit extraction cost. Total profits will be th
 
ple, if, 
your t
i)  12 ExCUs for the 1st unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 2 ExCUs it 
costs you extracting it). 
ii) 10 ExCUs for the 2nd unit sold (14 ExCUs yo inus 4 ExCUs it 
costs you extracting it). 
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r monetary reward at the end of the session will be the sum of all your profits 
accumulated along 15 rounds (randomly selected by the computer) of the total of 50 
, at an equivalence factor of 500 ExCUs=1 Euro. You will be paid in cash at the 
 
The 
• vide you with a table on which, conditional 
• will show you the total profits obtained in 
that round, including information about unit cost, market price and number of units sold of 
roduct, as well as your rival’s price. 
ssion of 5 rounds. Please, feel free to make any questions you may have during this 
ilot session. The aim is that you should take control of your own decision making. 
ank y
 
 
ii) 7 ExCUs for the 3rd unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 7 ExCUs it 
costs you extracting it).  
 
• You
rounds
end of the session. 
information 
During decision making, the computer will pro
to your bid and cost for the corresponding unit, the revenue as the net profit are calculated 
in each of the five possible scenarios: a) In case you only sell the 1st unit; b) If you just sell 
the first two units; …e) In case you sell 5 units. 
At the end of each round, the computer screen 
each p
• During the experiment, you will have at your computer screen a history of past rounds 
(own and rival market price, number of units sold, revenue and profits per product).  
 
In order to make sure you understood correctly the market described, we will proceed next to 
run a pilot se
p
 
Th ou very much for your collaboration. Good luck!  
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Trea
The aim  study how people make their decisions in certain contexts. 
Your decisions in the scenario explained below in detail, will be directly related to a monetary 
clari
ques
from
e in a market which is characterized by the following features: 
t L). That is, they are willing to pay more for H 
• 
m prices are 
alled price bids. In order to make your biding decisions, you have to take into account that: 
y product is included in the “table of 
costs” bellow. These costs are the same for the two products, and they are expressed in 
ExCUs, a fictitious Experimental Currency Unit. 
. Taking into account the costs of the table, you have to announce five minimum prices at 
which you are willing to sell each unit of the first five units of each product. Therefore, 
your decision making consists of fixing 5 price bids for each type of water. 
3. You should have in mind that, in order not to make any losses, price bids cannot be lower 
than the corresponding unit costs included in the table of costs. 
4. Price bids cannot be decreasing. That is, your bid for the 1st unit cannot be higher than your 
bid for the 2nd unit; the bid for the 2nd cannot be higher than the bid for the 3rd unit, and so 
on and so forth. 
tment 3 
of this experiment is to
reward you will receive in cash at the end of the experiment. Any doubt you may have will be 
fied personally to you by one of the organizers after you raise your hand. Beyond these 
tions, any other communication is strictly forbidden and is subject to immediate exclusion 
 the experiment.  
 
You participat
• You represent a social planner who produces two commodities: product H and product L. 
Specifically, product H is water of High quality, while product L is water of Low quality. 
Products H and L are substitutes, namely, consumers may, to a certain extent, substitute one 
type of water with the other. 
• There are two types of consumers: households and farmers. Although they have different 
preferences with respect to the two types of water, they all prefer water of high quality 
(product H) to water of low quality (produc
than for L. 
The market lasts for 50 rounds. 
 
Decision Making 
Your only decision as a producer is announcing the minimum price at which you are willing to 
sell each one of the first five units of each product. Such announcements of minimu
c
1.  The extraction cost per additional unit extracted and b
2
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 the table that the unit costs decrease with the stock size. At the beginning of the 
    Table of costs (expressed in ExCUs) 
Stock size 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 
5. Observe in
session, you have an initial stock size of 20 units for each product. At the beginning of each 
round, you get three more units for each type of water.  
6. Your stock size, for both types of water, can never exceed 20 units and, therefore, any 
additional (over 20) units you may receive are immediately lost. 
 
U 2 4 nit cost 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
           
Stock size 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
U 11 18 30 50 82 135 223 368 607nit cost 7 
 
mple  
pose that at the end of a round your stock size of, say product H, is 9 units. At the beginning 
e new roun
Exa
Sup
of th d, you get your additional 3 units (so that your stock now is 12 units). Observe 
2 units, the unit cost for the first five units extracted is the 
llowing: 
st unit: 2 ExCUs    
 
your bids should not be lower than the 
than 2 ExCU
ExCUs (cost for the 3rd unit 
rest of the units. 
be 10 units (7 you kept pl
in the table that, for a stock size of 1
fo
• the cost of the 1
• the cost of the 2nd unit: 4 ExCUs 
• the cost of the 3rd unit: 7 ExCUs 
• the cost of the 4th unit: 11 ExCUs 
• the cost of the 5th unit: 18 ExCUs 
In order not to make any losses, each one of 
corresponding unit cost. Therefore, in this example, your bid for the 1st unit should not be lower 
s (cost of the 1st unit); your bid for the 2nd unit should not be lower than neither 4 
of this unit), nor than the bid you fixed for the 1st unit; your bid 
should not be lower than neither 7 ExCUs, nor than your bid for the 2nd unit, and so on for the 
In case you sell 5 units of this product, the stock size at the beginning of next round would 
us 3 you get in the new round). If, given your bids for the five units, 
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begi
 
• illing to sell each unit of 
each one of the two products. You will fill in the boxes that appear at your computer 
screen with your p r product L). In each box, you 
 get information related to the corresponding unit cost. T id u it have 
numbers between zero and 2000. 
• Although you may propose five different price the same product will be 
a . This price will be your bid for t  
product. The number of units sold each period is calculated by a program which simulates 
mal behaviour of consu s. 
st
 price at which you will sell the three units will be your bid for the third unit, that is, 
 
•  to maximize the social benefit per unit sold 
in this market, which is defined as the difference between the utility level generated by each 
 type of water and all possible combinations of 
your sales are zero, your stock would be 15 units (12 you already had plus 3 you get at the 
nning of the round). 
Decisions  
You take decisions about the minimum price at which you are w
rice bids (5 bids for product H and 5 fo
will also he b s yo subm
to be integer 
 bids, all units of 
sold to consumers at single price he last unit sold of each
the opti mer
  
Example 
In the example above, assume that your bids for one of the products are: 10 (for the 1  unit), 12 
(for the 2nd), 14 (for the 3rd), 16 (for the 4th) and 20 (for the 5th). Given your bids, the program 
which simulates the optimal behaviour of consumers determines that 3 units of this product will 
be sold. The
14 ExCUs.  
 
 
The aim 
 As a social planner, your aim in each round is
unit consumed and the corresponding unit extraction cost.  
 
The information 
• At the beginning of each round, the computer will provide you with a table containing, 
conditional to the stock size for each
consumption of the two products, the corresponding social benefits (measured as the 
difference between the utility level and corresponding extraction costs) of that round. 
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rmation will include the unit cost, market price and number of units 
sold of each product. 
 the experiment, you will have on your computer screen a history of past rounds 
 
Mon
• 
ly selected by the computer) of the total of 
 
In or rectly the market described, we will proceed next to 
 a pilot session of 5 rounds. Please, feel free to make any questions you may have during this 
n. The aim is that you should take control of your own decision making.  
• At the end of each round, the computer screen will show you the social benefits obtained in 
that round. This info
• During
(market price for each product, number of units sold of each product an social benefit). 
etary reward 
Your monetary reward for participating in this experiment will be the sum of the social 
benefits accumulated along 15 rounds (random
50 rounds, at an equivalence rate of 800 ExCUs=1 Euro. You will be paid in cash at the 
end of the session. 
der to make sure you understood cor
run
pilot sessio
 
Thank you very much for your collaboration. Good luck!  
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We provide here th
fun
6.Appendix C:. Mathematical model 
e specific mathematical expressions used here to implement the 
model outlined in the main text. The household’s utility is given by the following 
ction:
( )
hQHhLhHhLhMhMhLhHh
h QKKU ,,( CKKKKQQ Δ−++++⋅= ))).((},(max{1ln5.20) min , 
where the last term in brackets denotes the purification costs: 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧Δ
=
Q
QKK
h
MhLhHhh
),,(
22
2
>++
Δ
otherwise
QQifKKQC MhminLhHhMhQ
,0
),)((
3  
The farmer’s utility function is as follows:  
[ ])())(3(5.01ln17),,( LFHFLFMFMFLFHFF KKKKQQKKU +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= HF  
:The cost function of producer i (i = H, L) is given by  i
K xS
ii dxeKC
j ii∫
−−=
0
2)( . Given the 
quantity restriction of 5 units and the discrete quantity space allowed, the following 
utility levels were assigned to the household (h) and the farmer (F) populations:  
Household Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 
High 0 0 174 301 356 378 378 
1 399 492 579 637 679 711 
2 555 624 690 753 797 832 
3 660 717 771 822 869 906 
4 740 789 836 880 920 959 
5 806 849 890 929 965 999 
       
Farmer Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 
High 0 0 187 354 471 560 631 
1 274 391 491 572 639 696 
2 422 509 584 647 702 749 
3 525 594 655 707 753 794 
4 604 662 712 757 798 834 
5 668 717 761 801 836 869 
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